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ABSTRACT 
Zambia is one of the poorest countries in Africa. Despite substantial reform 
during the 1990s, the economy has remained heavily dependent on urban-based mining. 
Copper￿s long-standing dominance led to a strong bias against agriculture, which 
undermined the sector￿s growth and export potential. Consequently poverty has remained 
concentrated within marginalized rural areas. Recent volatility in copper exports and 
growing foreign debt indicate the need for further economic diversification and pro-poor 
growth. These needs have been clearly identified in the country￿s Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper (PRSP), which outlines a series of policy objectives aimed at combating 
HIV/AIDS, reversing the deterioration of education and rural infrastructure, and 
accelerating agricultural growth.  
This paper uses a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to assess the 
potential impact on inequality and poverty of the key PRSP policies, as well as the effects 
of foreign debt forgiveness and changes in the copper sector. The findings suggest that, in 
the absence of very rapid growth, the pro-poor policies outlined in the PRSP will not 
enable Zambia to reach its Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of halving poverty by 
2015. Achieving this goal will require gross domestic product (GDP) to grow at an 
annual rate of over ten percent. Reduction in poverty can however be achieved by 
addressing HIV/AIDS, which currently reduces annual GDP growth by one percent. 
Furthermore, substantial poverty-reduction can occur through the acceleration of 
agricultural growth, although limited market opportunities necessitates supporting 
investment in rural infrastructure. Overall, the potential of the agricultural sector depends 
on the government￿s commitment to reforms and the continued removal of the anti-
agricultural bias created by the dominant copper sector. 
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Zambia is one of the poorest countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). In 2001, per-
capita income was US$320, only two-thirds of the Sub-Saharan average. The most recent 
household survey, which is for 1998, indicates that 55.8 percent of the populations fall 
below the national food poverty line (McCulloch et al., 2000). Human deprivation is also 
severe: 60 percent of children suffer from chronic malnourishment and 20 percent die 
before the age of five (UNICEF, 2003).  
Since the change in government following the 1991 elections, the Zambian 
authorities have engaged in far-reaching economic reforms, including stabilization 
programs, agricultural and trade reforms, public sector reform, and privatization. These 
structural reforms were expected to have a major impact on poverty and inequality. 
However the country￿s recent economic performance has been disappointing. In spite of 
the government meeting many of the fiscal and monetary targets stipulated under the 
structural adjustment programs (SAPs), economic growth has been slow and per capita 
incomes have declined. While this weak performance may indicate the ineffectiveness or 
inappropriateness of some of these policies for Zambia, a number of external factors have 
also hampered economic performance. These factors, which lie beyond the immediate 
scope of government policy, include several droughts, adverse changes in world 
commodity markets and, perhaps most devastatingly, the onslaught of HIV/AIDS. 
Furthermore, the current government inherited, and has since contributed to, an external 
debt that is so large that Zambia is classified as belonging to the group of heavily 
                                                 
* Hans Lofgren is a former Senior Research Fellow, James Thurlow is a Research Analyst from 
Development Strategy and Governance Division (DSGD), and Sherman Robinson is a former Institute 
Fellow of the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).    8
indebted poor countries (HIPCs). The burden of servicing this debt constrains the 
government￿s ability to spend on programs aimed at reducing poverty.  
The objective of this research, which is focused on Zambia￿s economy during the 
period 2001-2015, is threefold. First, we analyze the implications of projections for 
Zambia￿s economic performance generated by the World Bank￿s Revised Minimum 
Standard Model (RMSM), with an emphasis on sectoral growth and poverty. Secondly, 
we assess the impact of changes in the current economic environment (i.e., those changes 
that lie beyond the immediate control of government policy). These changes include the 
effects of falling world copper prices, the collapse of copper mining, and external debt 
forgiveness. Thirdly, drawing on government documents and research on the Zambian 
economy, we analyze the potential roles of selected policies in accelerating growth, 
improving household welfare and reducing poverty. The policies that we consider include 
increased HIV/AIDS-related health spending, increases in agricultural productivity, 
public investment in transport infrastructure, and increased public spending in education.  
Section 2 reviews Zambia￿s recent economic performance and the policies 
adopted by the government during the period of structural adjustment. This section also 
identifies from the literature key policies that may contribute to stronger growth and 
poverty reduction. The ￿base￿ dynamic path, which assumes a continuation of current 
trends and policies, is assessed using a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model for Zambia. The solution for the base year, 2001, is benchmarked to a 2001 Social 
Accounting Matrix (SAM). The SAM and the rest of the model database are presented in 
Section 3. Section 4 describes the CGE model.  
Using the CGE model and its database, Section 5 presents the BASE scenario for 
2001-2012. Selected model parameters have been fine-tuned so that the scenario matches 
the aggregate projections of the RMSM. The section then analyzes the role of Zambia￿s 
economic environment in influencing the country￿s economic performance. Finally, 
Section 5 addresses the potential impact of alternative government policies. The final 
section draws together the findings and reviews the prospects for Zambia￿s economy   9
during the coming decade. In an Appendix, we present additional details on the 
assumptions that underlie the model simulations.  
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II. RECENT  ECONOMIC  DEVELOPMENTS AND CURRENT  
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 
Although Zambia enjoyed high growth following its independence in 1964, 
growth slowed strongly following the rise in oil prices and the fall in copper prices during 
the mid-1970s. Acting as if the collapse of the world copper price was temporary, the 
government borrowed heavily in order to protect current consumption. However, by the 
early 1980s the government had realized that its own attempts at reform had failed and 
that the economy was not going to attain the growth rates of the 1960s if it continued 
along its current growth path. In 1983, the government adopted a SAP designed by the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This program failed to maintain 
political support within Zambia and was revoked in 1986. In response to a sudden 
economic downturn, the government in 1989 resumed negotiations with these two 
international institutions, leading to the elaboration of a new SAP in 1990. 
Structural Adjustment and Economic Performance in the 1990s 
Given the turbulent economic developments of the 1970s and 1980s, the chief 
objectives of the SAPs of the last decade were to establish macroeconomic stability, 
implement agricultural reforms, liberalize trade, strengthen industrial policy, and 
privatize state assets (McCulloch et al., 2000). Figures 1 to 4 show the state of the 
Zambian economy at the beginning of the 1990s, and how the SAP influenced the 
country￿s recent economic performance.  
At the start of the 1990s, the economy had entered a period of stagnation. 
National production was declining, inflation exceeded 100 percent, the government 
deficit was over seven percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and scheduled debt 
service was 61 percent of export earnings (McCulloch et al., 2000). It was in this context 
that the newly elected Zambian government adopted a new SAP. Over the course of the 
next ten years, the authorities managed to curb much of the instability that had plagued 
the economy up until the 1990s. By the mid-1990s inflation had been reduced from its 
original triple-digit levels to around 25 percent per year, a rate that was maintained until   11
2001 (Figure 1).  These lower levels of inflation also promoted a slower nominal 
depreciation of the exchange rate from 1995 onwards. The combined lowering and 
stabilization of these two indicators partially explain the gradual rise in investment as a 
share of GDP over the last five years (Figure 2). 
Stable GDP growth rates have not been achieved despite an increased spending 
share for investment (Figure 3). Between 1990 and 2001 the economy grew on average at 
only one percent per year. This weak aggregate performance is partly explained by the 
changing composition of GDP over this ten-year period (Figure 4). During the early 
1990s, GDP growth rates appear to have been driven by changes in agriculture. Between 
1990 and 1992, the government initiated the SAP by abolishing and ￿de-monopolizing￿ 
agricultural markets, and by removing maize and fertilizer subsidies. Removing price-
floors and subsidies on maize, Zambia￿s most important crop, led to a sharp decline in 
agriculture. Furthermore, there was a severe drought in 1992, which stalled reforms and 
further reduced GDP. In 1993 the government reduced agricultural subsidies, which 
resulted in increased pressure on the credit system, which eventually collapsed in 1994. 
The result was a significant shift away from maize production, towards higher value and 
more drought-resistant crops. In the context of other sectoral developments (including the 
downturn for copper mining), the share of agriculture in GDP has increased only 
marginally since the 1994 slump. 
Although agricultural reform has had a marked effect on domestic production, the 
largest compositional shift has been between industry and services (Figure 4). During the 
1970s and 1980s, capital-intensive manufacturing had been promoted through high tariff 
protection and an overvalued exchange rate. Furthermore, the country￿s dependence on 
mining, and copper in particular, was most pronounced during this period. In 1992 the 
government initiated a comprehensive program of trade liberalization in an attempt to 
encourage competition and efficiency. Quantitative restrictions were converted into 
tariffs, and Zambia￿s commitment to various multilateral trade agreements was   12
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strengthened. Imports rose temporarily in response to reduced tariffs and the newly 
unprotected manufacturing sector went into sharp decline. The level of exports was only 
maintained through continued devaluations of the exchange rate and the expansion of 
mining production.  
After 1995 the world price of copper began a slow and prolonged decline. This 
trend eroded Zambia￿s ability to generate the foreign earnings needed to finance imports, 
and deepened the country￿s foreign indebtedness. Both mining and manufacturing, the 
major industrial sectors, declined rapidly over the decade (Figure 4). By contrast, the 
services sectors have grown slightly and, since the level of GDP has been growing very 
slowly, services￿ share of GDP has risen. Among the service sectors, growth has been 
particularly high for wholesale and retail trade.  
Finally, Zambia initiated a far-reaching program of privatization. Between 1968 
and 1976 the Zambian government created a large number of state enterprises, which by 
1991 generated three-quarters of total GDP. Privatization began slowly in 1993 and 
picked up pace throughout the decade. Although the privatization of the state copper 
mines was initially politically opposed, the authorities finally agreed to sell the copper 
mines in 2000 following growing pressure from foreign donors. However, rapid declines 
in world copper prices in 2001 caused Anglo-American, the prospective buyer, to 
withdraw its offer to purchase the mines. As a result of Zambia￿s dependence on copper 
mining, both the falling world copper price and the possible withdrawal of investment 
from the mining sector may seriously threaten economic growth and stability in the 
coming decade. 
The Current Development Strategy 
Despite the far-reaching economic reforms that have been adopted over the last 
decade the Zambian economy has failed to achieve significant economic growth and 
reduction in poverty. Zambia has recently drawn up a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP) (Republic of Zambia, 2002). Although this document does not describe the 
country￿s macroeconomic strategy in full, it does provide the framework from which   15
broader economic strategies will be derived. This section looks both at broad 
macroeconomic issues and the more specific policies that have been highlighted in the 
PRSP.  
Starting with macroeconomic policies, the government has identified the need to 
maintain economic stability through the reduction of inflation. Although there has been 
considerable progress in recent years in curbing the high levels of inflation experienced 
during the 1980s and early 1990s, the current objective is to further reduce inflation to 
around five percent.  
One of the causes of high inflation has been the expansionary monetary policy 
adopted by the government to finance its budget deficit. Therefore a reduction in the 
deficit is seen as a prerequisite to reducing inflation and promoting economic stability. 
Such an environment is expected to attract both domestic investment (through lower 
interest rates) and foreign investment (by stabilizing the exchange rate and encouraging 
investor confidence).  
Investment is one of the two cornerstones of the proposed development strategy 
(Republic of Zambia, 2002). Exchange rate instability, low national savings, expensive 
short-term working capital, and a lack of microfinance currently hamper investment 
spending. In response, the government hopes to encourage domestic capital markets 
through a number of financial reforms and the extension of micro-credit schemes. 
Furthermore, the government hopes to attract private investors through the privatization 
of state assets (most notably the copper mines). According to the plan, revenues from 
privatization and government savings (from a cut in subsidies to loss-making state 
enterprises) will be used to implement pro-poor development policies.  
The most notable pro-poor policy shift is increased support of agriculture and 
rural development. Given the fall in world copper prices and the threatened contraction of 
mining, the agricultural and agro-processing sectors are seen as the main avenue for 
diversification (Lofgren et al., 2002). The government intends to expand agricultural 
production by promoting greater land utilization and higher productivity. Currently, land   16
ownership in Zambia is relatively informal, discouraging small farmers from investing in 
productivity-enhancing technology or assets. Through established property rights, explicit 
land ownership, and micro-credit, the government hopes that agricultural investment, 
land utilization, and productivity will rise. Broader rural development will also be 
encouraged via improvements in the road network, both by improved maintenance of the 
existing network and by extending it in rural areas. Such infrastructure improvements are 
also expected to promote growth and productivity in the tourism sector, which was 
identified in the PRSP as having high growth potential. Increased accessibility to more 
remote areas should increase land utilization and encourage investment in agriculture and 
tourism. Investment in energy infrastructure is also seen as important in stimulating 
economic growth in Zambia, where energy prices are higher than elsewhere in the region. 
Greater productivity, both within agriculture and manufacturing, should improve 
Zambia￿s competitiveness in international markets.  
Exports are seen as the second cornerstone of the country￿s development strategy 
(Republic of Zambia, 2002). However, judging from recent developments in world 
copper markets, export-led growth will need to originate from outside the copper mining 
sector. Through further trade liberalization and tax-incentives, the governments hopes 
that greater productivity and improved access to world markets will translate into greater 
exports from the non-mining sectors. Given the shortage of foreign exchange and the 
growing need for imported capital, the success of the country￿s poverty-reduction and 
development strategies are likely to rest on the performance of these export sectors, 
facilitated by an exchange rate policy that provides incentives for export growth. 
The spread of HIV/AIDS is of great economic and social concern. The PRSP 
recognizes that this epidemic has contributed enormously to the prevailing poverty in the 
country by lowering worker productivity and causing the death of breadwinners. 
Furthermore, both the state and extended families are now responsible for large numbers 
of street children whose parents have been killed by HIV/AIDS. Addressing HIV/AIDS 
through increased health spending is therefore seen as a high priority. Both HIV/AIDS 
and limited government resources have contributed to the deterioration of the country￿s   17
education system. Since greater worker productivity is important for job-creation, 
poverty-reduction, and economic growth, the improvement of this system is seen as a key 
policy-objective.  
In sum, Zambia￿s development strategy entails the promotion of investment and 
export-led growth. While recognizing the important role of mining, the PRSP has placed 
emphasis on agriculture, tourism, transport, and energy infrastructure for the productive 
sectors, as well as on education, health and HIV/AIDS spending. 
This report first analyzes sectoral and welfare implications of Zambia￿s current 
growth path. Based on the country￿s stated development strategy, the report then assesses 
the impact of changes in the economic environment and the adoption of those 
government policies that are seen as critical for the country￿s development. Given that 
these interventions have repercussions that extend throughout the economy, the analysis 
is based on an economy-wide general equilibrium framework that is built around a 
database for Zambia with 2001 as its base year.  
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III.  THE ZAMBIAN ECONOMY IN 2001 
In light of persistent poverty and inequality in Zambia, the authorities have 
proposed a number of policies aimed at strengthening poverty-alleviation. The economy-
wide impact of these policies forms the focus of this report, and are assessed using a 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for the country. This model is 
benchmarked or calibrated to a SAM for the year 2001 (Evans et al., forthcoming) that 
summarizes the structure of the Zambian economy. Knowledge of how the Zambia 
economy is represented in the database is critical to understanding the results of the 
simulations to follow. This section is therefore concerned with describing the Zambian 
economy as reflected in the 2001 SAM.  
Production and Trade 
Table 1 shows the structure of production and trade in 2001.
1 Agriculture 
accounts for less than a quarter of GDP, which is well below the Sub-Saharan average of 
32.8 percent.
2 While agricultural exports contribute only 9.1 percent to total export 
earnings, the export-intensities of the traditional and non-traditional agricultural sectors 
are high. For example, 76.6 percent of the total domestic production of traditional crops 
is exported. Although these sectors are relatively integrated with international markets, 
they account for only a small share of total Zambian agriculture. As such the overall 
export and import intensity of agriculture remains low.  
Zambia￿s small agricultural sector and its low export-intensity are undoubtedly a 
result of the long-standing dominance of copper mining exports. Although total mining 
contributes only 9.1 percent to GDP it is the largest export commodity, with a vast 
                                                 
1 ￿Staples￿ include maize, groundnuts, wheat, vegetables, livestock, and other staples crops. ￿Traditional￿ 
includes sugar, tobacco and coffee. ￿Non-traditional￿ includes cotton and export horticulture (e.g. cut 
flowers). ￿Other￿ agriculture includes fishing and forestry. 
2 Sub-Saharan average (which excludes South Africa) is taken from World Development Indicators (World 
Bank, 2003); Zambia data is taken from the Zambian provisional 2001 Social Accounting Matrix (Evans et 
al., 2003).   19
majority of these exports being copper.
3 The high export-intensity of 85 percent suggests 
that almost all of domestic mining production is exported. The domestic mining that 
remains in the country is largely comprised of gemstones, which are passed onto the 
manufacturing sector to be polished before being exported. Manufacturing dominates 
imports, accounting for over 85 percent of total imports in 2001. Most of these imports 
comprise capital goods used for investment.  
Table 1.  Production and Trade (2001) 





Agriculture 22.2  9.1 2.2 16.8 5.7 
    Staples  18.9 0.6 1.9 1.8  7.0 
    Traditional  1.3 5.2 0.0 76.6  0.0 
    Non-traditional  1.2 3.3 0.2 52.2  8.8 
    Other  0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 
Industry 25.7  85.8 86.0 28.1  46.3 
    Mining  9.1 53.3 0.7 85.0  15.1 
    Manufacturing  11.1 28.0 85.3 16.7  55.7 
    Other  5.5 4.5 0.0 7.1  0.0 
Services 52.1  5.1 11.9 1.6  5.9 
    Private  41.9 5.1 11.9 2.1  7.4 
    Public  10.2 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 
Total 100.0  100.0 100.0 13.4  25.4 
Source:  Authors￿ calculations from the Zambian Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for 2001. 
Services form a large part of the economy and generate more than half of GDP. 
The government accounts for only a fifth of total services produced in the country. 
Education and health spending are the two largest components of the government budget, 
accounting for 18.9 and 14.2 percent of total government spending, respectively. 
Government spending on the agricultural, industrial, and transportation sectors is 
comparatively low at 4.1, 1.8 and 3.3 percent of the budget respectively. Private services 
are dominated by the trade and transportation, as well as by financial services and real 
estate sectors. 
                                                 
3 Cobalt has recently become an important export, but since this commodity is a by-product of the copper 
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Table 2 shows the distribution of factor incomes both across and within sectors. 
The agricultural sectors account for a majority of the value-added generated by lower-
skilled labor. This is seen in the upper half of the table where agriculture￿s share of value-
added for uneducated educated labor is 79.4 percent. Most of this agricultural labor is 
employed in staples production. According to the lower half of the table, this sector is 
most intensive in unskilled labor. Non-traditional crops are also intensive in unskilled 
labor, but this is largely due to cotton production. Traditional crops by contrast are the 
most capital intensive of the crop sectors.   
The industrial sectors are the most capital intensive. In the case of mining, almost 
all value-added is generated by either the mineral resource or capital.  The services sector 
is intensive in its use of both capital and higher-skilled labor. 
Household Income and Expenditure 
Table 3 shows the distribution of the population across different household 
categories. These categories are chosen based on geographical and poverty-related 
considerations. Although a majority of the population is still in rural areas, rural-urban 
migration has been rapid. High migration has been encouraged by the long-standing bias 
against agriculture created by a large mining sector and a protected manufacturing sector. 
Most of the rural population lives on small-scale farms, while most of the urban 
population is in households headed by low-skilled self-employed workers.  
The interaction between factor incomes and household factor endowments 
determines household income. Rural households generate most of their income from 
returns to lower-skilled employment. The only exception to this is large-scale farms that 
are more dependent on high-skilled labor and capital. Medium-scale households are most 
dependent on primary-educated labor and land, while small-households rely on 
uneducated labor and land.   
Urban households by contrast generate most of their income from higher-skilled 
labor and capital. Households headed by public employees are most dependent on labor 
incomes, while high-skilled self-employed households rely on capital income. Mining   22
resource returns are largely earned by households headed by public employees and high-
skilled, self-employed workers. 
Table 3.  Population Distribution (2001) 
Household Category  Population  Share of Total 
Rural   6,507,407.0    62.6 
    Small-scale   5,724,640.0   55.0 
    Medium-scale   253,291.0   2.4 
    Large-scale   9,827.0   0.1 
    Non-farm   519,649.0   5.0 
Urban   3,892,593.0    37.4 
    Self-employed low skill   1,713,648.0   16.5 
    Private employees   811,704.0   7.8 
    Public employees   1,264,103.0   12.2 
    Self-employed skilled and employers   103,138.0   1.0 
Total   10,400,000   100.0 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators for total population, and 1998 LCMS for household 
distribution. 
Table 4.  Household Consumption Patterns (2001) 
Share of Total Household Consumption Spending 
Household Category  Agric. & Food  Manufactures  Utilities  Services  Total 
Rural 80.2  11.3  0.5  8.0  100.0 
    Small-scale  84.5 8.7  0.4  6.4  100.0 
    Medium-scale  67.7 18.8  0.5  13.0  100.0 
    Large-scale  48.5 26.3  3.6  21.7  100.0 
    Non-farm  69.9 18.5  0.8  10.9  100.0 
Urban 48.5  20.6  4.5  26.5  100.0 
    Self-employed low skill  53.2 19.2  4.3  23.3  100.0 
    Private employees  48.9 21.3  3.5  26.3  100.0 
    Public employees  47.9 20.0  4.6  27.5  100.0 
    Self-employed skilled 
and employers 
35.6 25.4  6.1  32.9  100.0 
Total 59.3  17.4  3.1  20.2  100.0 
Source: Authors￿ calculations from the Zambian Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for 2001 
 
Table 4 shows how household consumption patterns differ across household 
categories. Rural households spend more of their income on agricultural and food 
products than do urban households (with the exception of large-scale rural households). 
Spending shares for manufactured commodities are similar for urban and rural   23
households, although within rural areas it is the larger farms that spend most of their 
income on these commodities. Rural households consume fewer utilities as a share of 
their total spending as compared to urban households. Urban households have 
considerably higher consumption shares for services, although large-scale rural farm 
households also have a high spending share in this area. 
Government and Rest of the World 
In 2001 the government generated a majority of its revenue from personal taxes 
paid by higher-income urban households and from corporate taxes paid by non-
agricultural enterprises. Combined current spending exceeded revenues, however, leading 
to a budget deficit of 3.6 percent of GDP (i.e., negative government savings).  
On the current account (of the balance of payments), imports greatly exceeded 
exports in 2001. Despite some remittances received by households from the rest of the 
world, the current account balance was dominated by the trade deficit. The current 
account deficit in 2001 equaled 20.1 percent of GDP.  
Summary 
In its structure of production and trade, Zambia is typical of many Sub-Saharan 
countries. There is a strong reliance on the primary sector both in production and exports. 
A majority of import demand is for manufactured commodities, which are largely used 
for investment or intermediate demand. Services, which tend to be non-traded, are 
dominated by trade and transportation. Public services are also an important source of 
value-added in the economy. 
The distinction between rural and urban households is strong. The former are 
more dependent on farm-labor and land income, while the latter receive a majority of the 
income from capital and higher-skilled labor. Rural households spend more of their 
income on agricultural and food products, while urban households consume more 
services.   24
For its revenue, the government is dependent on direct taxes. The cost of 
servicing the foreign debt forces the government to borrow abroad, thereby further 
raising the debt burden. The debt repayments also worsen the current account, which in 
2001 was in substantial deficit.  
Based on this information describing the Zambian economy, a CGE model is 
constructed to reflect the structure of the economy and the specific constraints it faces. A 
description of this model is presented in the next section.  
   25
IV.  MODEL AND DATA 
The dynamic Zambia model described below has developed from the 
neoclassical-structuralist modeling tradition originally presented in Dervis et al. (1982), 
and represents an extension of the standard static CGE model developed at the 
International Food Policy Research Institute as described in Lofgren et al. (2002). The 
model is formulated as a set of simultaneous linear and non-linear equations, which 
define the behavior of economic agents, as well as the economic environment in which 
these agents operate. This environment is described by market equilibrium conditions, 
macroeconomic balances, and dynamic updating equations. 
The model belongs to the recursive dynamic strand of the dynamic CGE 
literature, which implies that the behavior of its agents is based on current and past 
conditions as opposed to future conditions (as is assumed in dynamic inter-temporal 
optimization models). The model is solved one period at a time and it is possible to 
separate the within-period component from the between-period component, where the 
latter captures the dynamics of the model. This section provides an overview of the 
model￿s structure.  
Within-period Specification 
The within-period component describes a one-period static CGE model. 
Following the disaggregation of the SAM to which the model is calibrated, the model 
identifies 30 productive sectors or activities that combine primary factors with 
intermediate commodities to produce output. The eight factors of production identified in 
the model include: (i) four types of labor distinguished according to maximum education 
attained (uneducated, primary, secondary, and post-secondary); (ii) three types of capital 
(agricultural, mining, and non-agricultural); and (iii) agricultural land. Producers make 
decisions in order to maximize profits with the choice between factors being governed by 
a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function. This specification allows 
producers to respond to changes in relative factor returns by smoothly substituting 
between available factors so as to derive a final value-added composite. Profit-  26
maximization implies that the factors receive income where marginal revenue equals 
marginal cost based on endogenous relative prices. Once determined, these factors are 
combined with fixed-share intermediates using a Leontief specification. The use of fixed-
shares reflects the belief that the required combination of intermediates per unit of output, 
and the ratio of intermediates to value-added, is determined by technology rather than by 
the decision-making of producers. The final price of an activity￿s output is derived from 
the price of value-added and intermediates, together with any producer taxes or subsidies 
that may be imposed by the government per unit of output. 
In addition to its multi-sector specification, the model also distinguishes between 
activities and the commodities that these activities produce. This distinction allows 
individual activities to produce more than a single commodity and conversely, for a 
single commodity to be produced by more than one activity. Fixed-shares govern the 
disaggregation of activity output into commodities since it is assumed that technology 
largely determines the production of secondary products. These commodities are supplied 
to the market. 
Substitution possibilities exist between production for the domestic and the 
foreign markets. This decision of producers is governed by a constant elasticity of 
transformation (CET) function, which distinguishes between exported and domestic 
goods, and by doing so, captures any quality differences between the two products. Profit 
maximization drives producers to sell in those markets where they can achieve the 
highest returns. These returns are based on domestic and export prices (where the latter is 
determined by the world price times the exchange rate adjusted for any taxes or 
subsidies). Under the small-country assumption, Zambia is assumed to face a perfectly 
elastic world demand at a fixed world price. The final ratio of exports to domestic goods 
is determined by the endogenous interaction of relative prices for these two commodity 
types. 
Domestically produced commodities that are not exported are supplied to the 
domestic market. Substitution possibilities exist between imported and domestic goods 
under a CES Armington specification. Such substitution can take place both in final and   27
intermediates usage. Again under the small country assumption, Zambia is assumed to 
face infinitely elastic world supply at fixed world prices. The final ratio of imports to 
domestic goods is determined by the cost minimizing decision-making of domestic 
demanders based on the relative prices of imports and domestic goods (both of which 
include relevant taxes). 
Transaction costs are incurred when commodities are traded in markets. Demand 
for trade and transportation services is a fixed coefficient per unit sold. The coefficient is 
disaggregated by type of commodity and trade (export, import, or domestic sale). . The 
final composite good, containing a combination of imported and domestic goods, is 
supplied to both final and intermediate demand. Intermediate demand, as described 
above, is determined by Leontief technology and by the composition of sectoral 
production. Final demand is dependent on institutional incomes and the composition of 
aggregate demand. 
The model distinguishes between various institutions within the Zambian 
economy, including enterprises (mining and non-mining), the government, and 11 types 
of households. The household categories are primarily distinguished according rural or 
urban areas. Rural households are further broken down into small-scale, medium-scale, 
large-scale farms, and non-farm households. Urban areas are disaggregated according to 
household head into low-skilled or high-skilled self-employed, and private or public 
employees.  
The primary source of income for households and enterprises are factor returns 
generated during production. For each factor, the supply is fixed within a given time-
period. Capital is immobile across sectors and fully employed, earning a flexible return 
that reflects its sector-specific scarcity value. The non-capital factors are mobile across 
sectors and fully-employed, with an economy-wide wage clearing each market. For the 
non-capital factors, each activity pays an activity-specific wage that is the product of this 
economy-wide wage and a fixed activity-specific wage distortion term. Final factor 
incomes also include remittances received from and paid to the rest of the world.   28
Households and enterprises earn factor incomes in proportion to the share that 
they control of each factor. Enterprises or firms are the sole recipient of non-agricultural 
capital income, which they transfer to households after having paid corporate taxes 
(based on fixed tax rates), saved (based on fixed savings rates), and remitted profits to the 
rest of the world. Households within each of the 11 representative groups are assumed to 
have identical preferences, and are therefore modeled as ￿representative￿ consumers. In 
addition to factor returns, which represent the bulk of household incomes, households 
also receive transfers from the government, other domestic institutions, and the rest of the 
world. Household disposable income is net of personal income tax (based on fixed tax 
rates), savings (based on fixed savings rates), and remittances to the rest of the world. 
Consumer preferences are represented by a linear expenditure system (LES) of demand, 
which is derived from the maximization of a Stone-Geary utility function subject to a 
household budget constraint. Given prices and incomes, these demand functions define 
households￿ real consumption of each commodity. The LES specification allows for the 
identification of supernumerary household income that ensures a minimum level of 
consumption.  
The government earns most of its income from direct and indirect taxes, and then 
spends it on consumption and transfers to households. Both of these payments are fixed 
in real terms. The difference between revenues and expenditures is the budget deficit, 
which is primarily financed through borrowing (or dis-saving) from the domestic capital 
market. 
Savings by households and enterprises are collected into a savings pool from 
which investment is financed. This supply of loanable funds is diminished by government 
borrowing (or dis-saving) and augmented by capital inflows from the rest of the world. 
There is no explicit modeling of the investment decision or the financial sector within a 
particular time-period, but aggregate savings-investment equality is required. One 
possible mechanism through which this balance is achieved is via adjustment in the 
interest rate (which may affect savings and/or investment). The disaggregation of 
investment into demand for final commodities is done assuming a fixed bundle of   29
investment commodities with changes in aggregate investment leading to proportional 
increases in the demand for individual commodities. 
Production is linked to demand through the generation of factor incomes and the 
payment of these incomes to domestic institutions, including households. Balance 
between demand and supply for both commodities and factors are necessary in order for 
the model to reach equilibrium. This balance is imposed on the model through a series of 
system constraints. 
The model includes three broad macroeconomic accounts: the government 
balance, the current account, and the savings and investment account. In order to bring 
about balance in the macro accounts, it is necessary to specify a set of mechanisms or 
macro ￿closure￿ rules. 
For the government, consumption is fixed in real terms. For most simulations, all 
tax rates are also fixed, with savings (showing the difference between current revenue 
and current spending) clearing the government account.
4 For the current account of the 
balance of payments (the rest of the world account), a flexible exchange adjusts to 
maintain a fixed level of foreign savings. In other words the external balance is held fixed 
in foreign currency. Nominal investment is a fixed share of nominal absorption ￿ other 
things being equal, real investment will respond positively (negatively) to decreases 
(increases) in the prices of investment commodities relative to other commodities. 
Adjustments in household savings rates assure that savings and investment values are 
equal (i.e., savings is driven by investment). Finally, the consumer price index was 
chosen as the numØraire. 
Between-period, Dynamic Specification 
The static model described above is extended to a recursive dynamic model. 
Selected parameters are updated based on the modeling of inter-temporal behavior and 
results from previous periods. Current economic conditions, such as the availability of 
                                                 
4 In some of the simulations, government savings is fixed while all direct tax rates on households are scaled 
to generate the revenue required to generate this level of savings.   30
capital, are thus endogenously dependent on past outcomes. The dynamic model is also 
exogenously updated to reflect demographic and technological changes that are based on 
projected trends.  
The process of capital accumulation is modeled endogenously, with previous-
period investment generating new capital stock for the subsequent period. Although the 
allocation of new capital across sectors is influenced by each sector￿s initial share of 
aggregate capital income, the final sectoral allocation of capital in the current period is 
dependent on the capital depreciation rate and on sectoral profit-rate differentials from 
the previous period. Sectors with above-average capital returns receive a larger share of 
investible funds than their share in capital income. The converse is true for sectors where 
capital returns are below average.
5  
Population, labor force and productivity growth are exogenously imposed on the 
model based on separately calculated growth projections. It is assumed that a growing 
population generates a higher level of consumption demand and therefore raises the 
supernumerary income level of household consumption.  
Projected changes in the current account balance are exogenously accounted for. 
Mining production is assumed to be predominantly driven by a combination of changes 
in world demand and prices, and other factors external to the model. Accordingly, the 
value-added growth of these sectors and the world price of exports are updated 
exogenously between periods. 
The Zambian dynamic model is solved as a series of within-period equilibria, 
each one representing a single year. By imposing the above policy-independent dynamic 
adjustments, the model produces a projected or counterfactual growth path. Policy 
changes can then be expressed in terms of changes in relevant exogenous parameters and 
the model is re-solved for a new series of equilibria. For policy shifts that involve 
additional government spending, we increase real government consumption, thereby the 
main burden of these policies, the diversion of resources from private consumption and 
                                                 
5 For more details see Dervis et al. (1982).   31
investment in non-government production. Differences between the policy-influenced 
growth path and that of the counterfactual can then be interpreted as the economy-wide 
impact of the simulated policy.  
Database 
The model database, which captures the structural features of the Zambian 
economy, consists of a SAM; base-year and projected values for labor force, population, 
government policies, foreign savings, foreign borrowing, interest payments on foreign 
debt, and factor productivity; and a set of elasticities (for trade, production and 
consumption). 
The SAM was constructed using input-output data, including an earlier SAM 
(Hausner, 1999), as well as the database assembled by the World Bank for its 2001 
RMSM of Zambia and the 1998 Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) (Evans 
et al., forthcoming).  
Base-year data on the population of each household group and the labor force are 
from the 1998 LSMS. The population and labor force numbers were scaled to match 
2001 totals extracted from other World Bank data (World Bank, 2003). The AIDS-
adjusted growth rates from 2001 to 2015 for population and labor are from IMF (2003). 
The size of the capital stock was estimated on the basis of value-added and gross capital 
income data in the SAM, a depreciation rate of 4% (from the RMSM), and an assumed 
net profit rate of 25 percent. 
The RMSM provided the data related to the foreign debt for the entire planning 
horizon: the base-year capital stock and, for each year during the planning horizon, 
interest payments actually paid and due, net foreign borrowing, and foreign grants.  
The model is used to simulate the impact of policies and economic shocks on 
growth and poverty. Its structure supports analysis of trade-offs and synergies between 
different policies, the consequences of alternative financing mechanisms, and the extent 
to which foreign debt forgiveness can facilitate the task of reducing poverty.   32
V.   SIMULATIONS 
The Base Growth Path Simulation 
The World Bank has used the Zambia RMSM to project a growth path for 
Zambia￿s economy for the period 2001-2015. In this section, the Zambian CGE model is 
used to determine the implications of this current or ￿base￿ macro growth path for 
disaggregated growth, trade, welfare, and poverty. The dynamic or ￿between-period￿ 
component of the model is calibrated to the RMSM in order to replicate the performance 
of key economic indicators. The indicators chosen to be important in calibrating the 
model and the values used in the base growth path are described below. This section then 
describes in detail the results of the base simulation. 
Describing the Base Growth Path 
Table 5 outlines the key assumptions used to determine the Base growth path. 
Population and labor force growth are taken from the IMF (2003) study on the impact of 
HIV/AIDS on the Zambian economy. The Base growth path therefore includes the 
projected effect of HIV/AIDS on the accumulation of human capital and overall 
mortality. All capital depreciates at four percent per year, which given the capital-output 
ratio, implies a net profit rate of around 20 percent.  
Government expenditure comprises both consumption spending and transfers to 
domestic institutions. In the Base growth path, transfer spending grows at three percent 
per year in real terms. Drawing on RMSM data, real government consumption grows at 
three percent per year. In later simulations government consumption spending increases 
as new government policies are implemented. These include health spending for 
HIV/AIDS treatment, agriculture spending for agricultural investment, and transportation 
spending for improved rural infrastructure.  
Based on projections from the World Bank, the current account deficit is expected 
to gradually decline over the coming decade at a rate of two percent per year. 
Furthermore, work presented in Chapter 7 of the World Bank CEM (Country Economic   33
Memorandum) for Zambia (World Bank, 2004) identified three possible scenarios for the 
copper export sector: a high, average, and low-case scenario. In the Base growth path, it 
is assumed that the average-case scenario is realized and that output and world prices 
decline at annual rates of one and two percent, respectively. Alternative assumptions 
regarding the copper mining sector are explored later and are contrasted to this Base 
assumption. 
Table 5.  Base Simulation Assumptions 
Item  Annual growth 
rate (%) 
Source 
Real gross domestic product (GDP) growth  4.1  RMSM 
Population growth  2.0  RMSM & IMF (2003) 
Labor force growth     
Uneducated 2.0  IMF  (2003) 
Primary educated  2.0  IMF (2003) 
Secondary educated  1.7  IMF (2003) 
Post-secondary educated  1.7  IMF (2003) 
Capital depreciation rate  4.0  RMSM 
Total factor productivity growth  2.3  Endogenous  
Government spending     
Consumption 3.0  RMSM 
Transfers 3.0  Assumed 
Foreign inflows (foreign savings)*  2.0  RMSM 
Interest rate on foreign debt     
Due   2.8  RMSM 
Paid   1.1  RMSM 
Copper mining sector      
Output growth  -1.0  World Bank (2004) 
World export price growth  -2.0  World Bank (2004)  
*In the base year, foreign savings (the current account deficit) represented 20.1 percent of GDP. 
 
Interest payments due on government debt correspond to an annual rate of 2.8 
percent. However, in the past, the government has paid interest at a rate of only 1.1 
percent. This influences foreign debt growth, as any shortfall in interest payments is 
added to the debt in the following year, with implications for future interest payments. 
The effect of reducing annual debt and interest payments through HIPC debt relief are 
explored in this paper.    34
Finally, the economy-wide total factor productivity (TFP) growth rate is adjusted 
in order to match the GDP growth rate of the RMSM, 4.1 percent. To attain this rate of 
GDP growth, an annual TFP growth of 2.3 percent is required. As shown in Chapter 2 of 
the CEM (World Bank, 2004), while this TFP growth rate is attainable if recent upward 
trends in TFP growth persist, it is higher than the growth rates achieved over the last 
decade. 
Results for the Base Scenario  
The macroeconomic results for the Base scenario are summarized in the second 
column of Table 6. Real annual GDP growth of 4.1 percent matches the projected growth 
rate from the RMSM. The slow decline in copper production and world copper prices 
causes export earnings to decline, other things being equal requiring more rapid export 
growth and/or slower import growth. As a result, the growth in total absorption (the sum 
of private consumption, government consumption, and investment) falls short of GDP 
growth by around one percent. The growth rates for private consumption and investment 
are close to the exogenous growth rate for government consumption, three percent. The 
depreciation of the real exchange rate suggests that the projected growth in foreign 
inflows or borrowing is insufficient to relieve the pressure on the current account. The 
real exchange rate therefore responds to this pressure by depreciating in order to 
encourage exports and reduce imports. The growth of real investment, which is the most 
import-intensive GDP component, is slowed down by the depreciation of the exchange 
rate. 
At a sectoral level, mining production is stagnant while mining exports decline 
(second column of Table 7). Following the depreciation however there is a shift in 
production towards those sectors that are either relatively strong exporters (including 
manufacturing) or sectors with a high but underutilized propensity to export (including 
agriculture). Accordingly, there is rapid export growth within the traditional and non-
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Growth in household consumption exceeds population growth, permitting per-
capita consumption to increase. The growth pattern is pro-rural: per-capita consumption 
grows more rapidly for rural households than for their urban counterparts. Accordingly, 
rural households have the greatest declines in poverty, as measured by the poverty 
headcount rate. Rural poverty declines by over eight percentage points, as compared to 
only 4.5 percentage points for urban households. Within rural areas, it is small and 
medium-scale households that benefit the most. This result arises from the gradual shift 
towards agricultural export production. At the crop level, it is small-scale-intensive 
cotton and medium-scale-intensive horticulture that grow fastest. Both sectors grow in 
excess of ten percent per year, a rate that is consistent with recent trends in these crops. 
However, the model does not disaggregate poverty spatially. This may be important 
given that cotton and horticultural production currently take place in the Eastern, Central 
and Lusaka regions where access to markets is better.
6 Accordingly, the reduction in 
poverty is unlikely to extend to more remote rural households.    
Figure 5 shows the long-run effects of the Base growth path on poverty-reduction. 
The results suggest that Zambia will be unable to meet the Millennium Development 
Goal (MDG) of halving poverty by 2015. Rather, poverty will only decline moderately, 
from 55.9 percent to 49 percent.  A model simulation that was extended further into the 
future suggests that Zambia will not be able to halve poverty until after 2040. In 
extending this finding, Thurlow (2004) estimates that a sectorally balanced GDP growth 
rate of between 10.5 and 11 percent per year is necessary in order to achieve the MDG. 
These findings are broadly consistent with McCulloch et al. (2002), who estimate the 
necessary GDP growth rate to be between seven and nine percent.
7 
 
                                                 
6 See Chapter 5 of the CEM for a detailed account of agricultural production in Zambia (World bank, 
2004). 
7 McCulloch et al (2000) base their estimate on growth-poverty elasticities calculated from the 1991, 1996 
and 1998 household surveys. The estimated necessary growth rate varies according to assumptions 
regarding the initial and later fixed distribution of consumption across households.    39




Despite average per-capita consumption rising by 1.3 percent per year, the Base 
growth path does not suggest that Zambia will be able to reduce poverty sufficiently over 
the coming decade to satisfy its ambitious poverty-reduction goals. Accordingly, the 
government needs to search for additional policies that can bring about more rapid 
growth and/or direct the gains from growth more effectively toward the poor. However, 
such policies would have to be implemented in an environment where a number of 
external factors continue to force the economy through a process of structural adjustment. 
Perhaps the most important of these external forces are the recent and ongoing 
developments in the copper mining sector, and the worsening onslaught of HIV/AIDS.   
Copper Sector Simulations 
Copper dominates mining, which in turn is one of the country￿s most important 
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percent since the 1995 peak.
8 Furthermore, copper mining in Zambia has been 
jeopardized by the threatened withdrawal of investment by the Anglo-American mining 
company, which might well result in the closing of some of the copper mines (Craig, 
2002; World Bank, 2002). Zambia￿s PRSP identifies the collapse of the copper mining 
sector as posing the most immediate and significant risk to poverty reduction (Republic 
of Zambia, 2002). 
The copper mining simulations presented in this section draw on predictions 
outlined in Chapter 7 of the CEM (WB, 2004). Three potential scenarios were described 
in detail and have been incorporated into the model. As mentioned earlier, the Average-
case scenario, in which exogenous output and price changes are imposed on the copper 
mining sector, has already been assumed for the Base scenario. In this section, the two 
remaining scenarios are compared to the Base scenario. The assumed annual output and 
price changes for the three scenarios are presented in Table 8 and are described in detail 
in the Appendix. 
Under the Average-case scenario, world copper prices would continue their 
decline from their current rate of US$1.16 per pound to US$1.07 in 2005. This implies an 
annual fall in copper prices of two percent. In the Base scenario, this decline was 
assumed to continue across the 15 years of the study. Furthermore, it was predicted that 
output is likely to decline by 100,000 tons during the period of consolidation leading up 
to 2006. This loss would then be regained in the years until 2010, when output would fall 
again by 40,000. This implies an annual decline in output over the coming decade of one 
percent. 
In the High-case scenario, prices are expected to rebound slightly to US$1.18 in 
2006. An annual growth rate of 0.5 percent is therefore applied across the 2001-2015 
period. Output is expected to increase by 100,000 tons by 2007/08, and the again by 
150,000 tons in 2010 as new mines open. Mining output is therefore expected to rise at an 
average annual rate of 4.3 percent over the 15-year period. 
                                                 
8 For an analysis see Lofgren et al (2002).   41
Table 8.   Output and World Price Changes for the Copper Mining Sector 
(2001-2015) 








World copper export price  0.5  -2.0  -5.0 
Copper mining output  4.3  -1.0  -5.0 
Source:  Authors￿ calculations based on Chapter 7 of the CEM (WB, 2004). 
 
Finally, in the Low-case scenario, mining output is expected to decline first by 
100,000 tons until 2006/07 before rebounding by the same amount in 2009. However, 
unlike the High-case scenario, the Low-case scenario assumes that the additional 
investment necessary to open the new mines in 2010 will not be forthcoming. Mining 
output is expected to decline sharply by 150,000 in that year. Furthermore, world prices 
are expected to continue their sharp declines of the late 1990s, with the price dropping to 
US$0.95 in 2006. Both output and world prices are therefore expected to decline at an 
annual rate of five percent. This is imposed for the entire 15-year period. 
High-case Copper Scenario 
Under the Base scenario the decline in world copper prices and domestic output 
results in falling export earnings, which in turn places pressure on the current account. 
Since no additional foreign borrowing is assumed to take place, the real exchange rate 
depreciates, encouraging exports and reducing imports. However, falling mining output 
erodes urban incomes, a development that is only partially offset by expanded 
manufacturing resulting from the depreciated exchange rate. Rather, the rural areas 
benefit from greater international competitiveness for agricultural exports. In this way, 
the failing mining sector contributes to faster declines in rural poverty than urban 
poverty. 
Under the High-case scenario, however, the contraction of the mining sector is 
replaced with a rapid expansion that is coupled with a gradual rise in copper export 
prices. As seen in the third column of Table 7, mining exports reverse their decline and   42
begin to grow, albeit at the relatively slow rate of 0.7 percent per year. This growth in 
exports relieves some of the pressure placed on the current account under the Base 
scenario, resulting in a slower depreciation of the real exchange rate. Accordingly, while 
mining exports grow faster than under the Base scenario, all other export growth rates 
decline. The incentive to diversify production and exports away from the mining sector 
has been partially removed. By contrast, the lower depreciation of the exchange rate 
lowers the import price relative to the Base scenario. Since investment demand is highly 
import intensive it grows faster under the High-case scenario. Higher investment 
compensates for slower export growth and result in a GDP growth rate that is slightly 
higher than that of the Base scenario. 
All households are better off under the High-case scenario, as reflected in more 
rapid private consumption growth (Table 7) and the lower poverty headcounts (Table 6). 
Urban households benefit the most from the improved copper mining performance, since 
these households (in this case high-skilled employer households) are the main recipients 
of mining income. 
Low-case Copper Scenario  
In contrast to the previous simulation, the Low-case simulation presents a worst-
case scenario for the copper mining sector. Both output and world prices fall rapidly 
resulting in pressure being placed on the current account. This terms-of-trade shock 
requires a smaller trade deficit in non-mining products, with a negative impact on 
absorption. The real exchange rate depreciates in order to offset the fall in export 
earnings by encouraging production of tradables while discouraging their consumption 
locally, thereby raising exports, and reducing imports. The sectors that respond the 
greatest are the agricultural sectors, which have the highest export-intensities. Within 
agriculture it is the traditional and non-traditional crops sectors that grow the fastest. 
Depreciation also raises the price of imported capital equipment and vehicles, 
which form the bulk of fixed investment demand. Accordingly, investment growth   43
declines slightly more strongly than private consumption, with a negative impact on the 
GDP growth rate. 
For the households, the slow down in consumption growth relative to the base is 
limited to urban households and relatively well-off rural households. Even though the 
overall poverty headcount rises compared to the Base scenario, rural households actually 
experience a slight decline in their poverty headcount (although this is not evident from 
the table) while the urban rate increases by one percentage point. As shown in Table 7, 
the cushioning of rural poverty is driven by growth in the agricultural sectors￿ exports as 
a result of the more heavily depreciated real exchange rate.   
The results from the Base and copper mining scenarios suggest that, while falling 
copper output and prices have a negative impact on economic growth, a further collapse 
of the copper mining sector does not greatly affect rural households. The recent and 
ongoing developments in the copper sector and its threatened closure might actually 
result in a pro-poor contraction of the economy relative to the Base scenario.
9  
One way for the government to avoid the declines in the GDP growth rate 
experienced under the Low- and Average-case scenarios is to increase foreign borrowing 
in order to supplement falling export earnings. However, such a move would bring about 
a slower depreciation of the real exchange rate and thereby dilute any incentives for the 
country to diversify production of tradables and exports away from mining. Given the 
long-standing dependence of the country on copper mining, and the need to overcome the 
vulnerability caused by threatened closures of mines and price falls, the government 
should be hesitant to drastically alter this restructuring process. 
HIPC Debt Forgiveness Simulation 
As already mentioned, Zambia is heavily burdened by debt. Much of this debt 
was accumulated during the late 1970s when world copper prices fell and the government 
borrowed to alleviate what was seen as only a temporary terms-of-trade shock. 
Unfortunately the shock was not temporary and foreign debt has continued to increase, 
                                                 
9 See Baulch and McCullouch (2000) and Ravallion (2003) for alternative definitions of pro-poor growth.   44
accelerating during the 1990s. The servicing of this debt, which exceeds 150 percent of 
total export earnings, has become a substantial burden for the country and limits its 
ability to reduce poverty and improve living standards.  
Given that foreign exchange expenditure continues to exceed revenues, the 
government has not been able to pay back the debt. The RMSM estimates the annual 
interest rate due on the debt at 2.8 percent, but the government is estimated to pay only 
one percent. As such, the debt increases further at a rate equal to this interest differential. 
In 2000, Zambia was selected as one of the HIPC countries. On this basis and starting 
from 2002, Zambia is entitled to debt relief that, in the absence of other changes, would 
lower the total external debt by 69 percent in 2003 (Bigsten et al, 2001; WTO, 2002).  
The following simulations assume that the actual impact of debt forgiveness is not 
the full interest due annually, but rather the interest that the government has effectively 
been paying in recent years. Apart from this debt reduction, the Base scenario remains 
unchanged, implicitly assuming that Zambia is meeting the different conditions of the 
debt-relief program, including implementation of (including allocation of additional 
resources to) the country￿s poverty-reduction strategy, and progress in fighting 
HIV/AIDS and educational reforms (Bigsten et al., 2001).
10  
The direct effect of debt reduction is reduced government debt servicing, thus 
limiting the tendency of the real exchange rate to depreciate. This raises government 
savings, investment growth, and growth in the capital stock. However, the final effects 
are very limited. As shown in column four of Table 6, investment grows more rapidly, 
raising import demand (a large share of capital goods are imported) and counteracting the 
tendency toward appreciation. Marginally higher capital stock growth permits real GDP 
and household consumption to grow more quickly. 
All households are slightly better off following debt relief since they enjoy higher 
income and consumption levels resulting from higher GDP growth. Ultimately, the 
                                                 
10 These programs are the focus of the simulations in the next section of this paper. It is also assumed that 
that the program does not suffer from corruption and other problems surrounding the debt relief of the early 
1990s. (For a review of these issues, see Copestake and Weston 2000). See the appendix.   45
impact of debt relief is positive but relatively small, implying that debt relief has a very 
limited impact on poverty unless accompanied by additional and effective measures 
aimed at poverty reduction. 
Pro-Poor Policies for Poverty Reduction 
The scenarios in the previous sections considered the impact of changes in 
conditions that are largely outside of government control. By contrast, the scenarios in 
the following sections analyze the impact of policy actions that the government might 
implement over the coming decade.  
Four focus areas for policy changes are considered, including (i) increased 
HIV/AIDS health spending; (ii) the public provision of education; (iii) measures that 
accelerate agricultural growth; (iv) public investment in transport infrastructure. The 
HIV/AIDS and education scenarios address two problems that are seen as most pressing 
for Zambia in terms of their effects on human development (Republic of Zambia, 2002). 
Finally, accelerating agricultural growth and investment in transport infrastructure are 
complementary components of Zambia￿s rural development strategy.  
For most of these policy changes, the actions that are considered generate 
significant changes in the balance between government spending and revenues, with 
consequences for domestic government borrowing and other components of absorption. 
To explore the impact of this repercussion, some of the following simulations are 
implemented both with and without complementary changes in direct tax rates. This 
additional tax revenue from mainly urban households is sufficient to keep the 
government￿s domestic borrowing in each year at the same level as under the Base 
scenario. Furthermore, given that the results of the HIPC scenario suggest that debt relief 
on its own is not likely to greatly influence poverty, many of the following sections 
present simulations in which the government funds that are saved through the HIPC 
agreement are used to implement pro-poor policies.   46
HIV/AIDS Simulations 
HIV/AIDS is a rapidly growing problem for Zambia. Prevalence rates already 
exceed 20 percent of the adult population (Republic of Zambia, 2002). According to 
Cheru (2000), the virus has become the greatest present threat to development, reversing 
past achievements in generating economic growth, improving life expectancy, and 
decreasing child malnutrition.  
In light of this current crisis, the government of Zambia may have little choice but 
to expand its current level of AIDS-related health spending. However, according to IMF 
(2003), the cost of the drugs necessary to combat the epidemic is prohibitively high. 
Estimates from other countries on the costs per patient of providing basic treatment range 
between 100 and 400 percent of GDP per capita. Furthermore, while there is some scope 
for private sector involvement, it seems likely that a majority of domestic health spending 
will originate from within the public sector. In its PRSP, the government has outlined a 
series of actions to be taken in response to this growing threat, including educational 
programs, community-based home care, and measures targeted at orphans and vulnerable 
children (IMF, 2003).  
The main channels through which HIV/AIDS is assumed to influence the real 
economy are through the growth rates of the population, labor force, and total factor 
productivity (TFP). IMF (2003) has conducted a study in which they estimate growth 
rates both with and without HIV/AIDS. In the Base scenario it was assumed that 
HIV/AIDS is a reality in Zambia and as such should be included within the Base 
assumptions. However, in order to gauge the extent to which HIV/AIDS has reduced 
GDP growth and increased poverty, the AIDS treatment scenarios increase population, 
labor force and TFP growth rates towards the levels that the IMF (2003) estimate would 
have prevailed in the absence of HIV/AIDS. The assumed changes in these growth rates 
are presented in Table 9 and are discussed in detail in the appendix.  
Population growth in particular would be significantly higher were it not for the 
high mortality caused by HIV/AIDS. Mortality is also captured through a decline in labor   47
force growth rates, which is assumed to more greatly affect lower-skilled workers. 
Morbidity is captured through declines in the TFP growth rate. Beyond mortality and 
morbidity, the declines in labor force and TFP capture decreased work hours and 
increased care giving for non-sick workers. No adjustment is made however for changes 
in household consumption patterns to account for increased health spending.  Higher 
dependency ratios are implicitly captured in the model since the population growth rate 
exceeds the labor force growth rate by a higher percentage than under the AIDS treatment 
scenarios. 
Table 9.   HIV/AIDS Scenario Assumptions for Productivity, Population 
and Labor (%) 
Assumption  Base scenario 
(annual growth rate) 
AIDS treatment scenarios 
(annual growth rate) 
Total factor productivity (TFP)  2.3  2.8 
Population 2.0  3.3 
Labor force     
      Uneducated  2.0  3.3 
      Primary  2.0  3.3 
      Secondary  1.7  2.5 
      Post-secondary  1.7  2.5 
Source: Base scenario population from RMSM, labor force from IMF (2003), and TFP from 
Zambia model. AIDS scenarios from IMF (2003). 
Costless Treatment Scenario 
In light of the objectives stated in the PRSP, the first AIDS scenario (￿costless 
treatment￿) assesses the impact of removing the effects of AIDS without requiring the 
government to increase its level of health spending. Column 6 of Tables 6 and 7 presents 
the results.  
Increased factor growth rates and TFP allow production to increase, thus raising 
the level of GDP. In the absence of HIV/AIDS the Zambian economy would have grown 
annually at five percent. Comparing this to the Base scenario suggests that HIV/AIDS 
costs the Zambian economy almost one percent in GDP growth per year. At the sectoral   48
level, growth accelerates the most for agriculture, i.e. the part of the economy that is 
relatively intensive in labor with little or no education.  
The benefits of more rapid growth are dispersed over a larger population. In terms 
of per-capita consumption, the removal of AIDS has little impact, with minimal changes 
in per-capita consumption, overall and for the different groups, and a very small increase 
in the total poverty headcount rate. In reality there is likely to be some differences in 
infection rates across rural and urban areas with implications for the distribution of gains 
across rural and urban areas. However, this information was not available for this study. 
With the exception of South Africa, where rural infection rates are highest, other 
countries in the region (e.g. Tanzania) have lower infection rates in rural areas.  
Public Financed Treatment Scenario 
The above simulation suggested that GDP growth would increase by one 
percentage point per year if AIDS were not a reality in Zambia. However, the economic 
impact of treating the disease may be very different. The cost of funding an AIDS 
treatment program remains very high in spite of declines in recent years. For example, the 
estimated annual cost of anti-retroviral treatment for a single patient is around US$360 in 
Zambia. This is higher than in Malawi where AIDS treatment is cheapest at US$288 per 
person.  
Given the high cost of treatment, the following simulations do not assume that the 
government will be able to afford to treat the entire infected adult population. Rather, we 
will assume that only half of the infected population is treated, with the government 
bearing the full cost of this program. This amounts to the treatment of 650,000 people at a 
total cost of 7.1 percent of GDP in 2001. Such a large increase in spending increases total 
government expenditure by 50 percent in 2001, thus more than tripling current 
government health spending. In the model, this is reflected in increased government 
consumption. It is assumed that the additional health spending will have to continue 
throughout the 2002-2015 period. Since only 50 percent of the infected population is   49
being treated, the acceleration in population, labor force and TFP growth is only half of 
what is shown in Table 9. 
The impact of both the partial alleviation of AIDS and the increase in government 
health spending is shown in column 7 of Tables 6 and 7. Although the increases in the 
labor force and TFP have a positive effect on GDP growth, the cost of the treatment 
program greatly outweighs these gains. Government consumption growth increases 
considerably from three percent in the Base scenario to six percent in the Publicly 
Financed scenario. The rate of real investment growth increases, but by less than GDP 
growth while household consumption stagnates.
11 However, the increased economic 
growth caused by a greater supply of productive factor resources, leads to an accelerated 
investment growth rate of 2.9 percent. Rising investment demand increases import 
demand, with exports rising alongside GDP. 
On the sectoral level, the growth acceleration is spread across the three main 
sectors. Agriculture grows faster under the current scenario, although this growth is 
concentrated in the export agriculture crops. Manufacturing and services sectors benefit 
from the increases in investment demand and government consumption.  
The burden of publicly financed AIDS treatment is evident in the declines in 
annual per-capita consumption growth, by around a half percent for most household 
groups. Similarly, poverty increases moderately, by slightly less than one percentage 
point. The results for this scenario show that if government consumption is increased as 
required while investment is protected (in terms of its absorption share), cuts in private 
consumption are necessary. These losses should be compared to the gains of treatment in 
the form of increased longevity and healthier lives for those treated.  
                                                 
11 The distribution of growth between household consumption and investment is influenced by the macro 
closure rule that investment is a fixed share of nominal absorption with balancing adjustments (in this case 
an increase) in household savings rates. If, alternatively, household savings rates would have been fixed, 
household consumption would have increased in the short to medium run, until the resulting decline in 
capital stock growth would impose reduced consumption.    50
Balanced Budget Scenario 
The following simulation considers the impact of treating the same 50 percent of 
the infected population as in the previous simulation, but with a compensating increase in 
direct tax rates on domestic institutions. As can be seen from column 8 of Tables 6 and 7, 
the growth rate of government consumption still rises by the same amount as in the 
previous simulation. However, increased revenues through increased direct taxation now 
offset the increase in government spending. The average aggregate direct tax rate on 
households almost doubles from an initial average rate of 8.5 percent to 12.4 percent.
12 
This increase in revenues prevents an increased budget deficit from crowding-out 
investment. However, the higher tax rates imposed on the country￿s higher-income 
households reduce their level of savings, thus reducing the gains from lower government 
spending. Ultimately investment to grows at 2.9 percent per year. As seen in Table 7, the 
increased tax rates reduce the level of disposable income for higher-income urban 
households, and this reduces the level of private consumption growth. Ultimately, while 
investment growth raises import demand, this is offset by falling import demand from 
urban households. 
Rural households benefit both from the increased incomes from higher labor force 
growth, and from being excluded from the financing of the treatment program. Therefore, 
while all rural households enjoy more rapid poverty reduction in the Balanced Budget 
scenario as compared to the Publicly Financed scenario, it is the rural households that 
benefit the most. Urban households suffer an increase in poverty due the higher tax 
burden, although lower-skilled self-employed households do have higher per-capita 
consumption growth in the Balanced Budget scenario. 
                                                 
12 The average rate is calculated based only on the incomes received of those households and corporations 
that pay direct tax. Including all rural households would greatly reduce the average tax rate. It should also 
be noted that the stated tax rate is based on direct tax collections and not on the statutory tax rate stated in 
the tax register. This is an example of a simulation where all direct tax rates for households are scaled (in 
this case upwards) to generate the required level of government savings. Given that households with high 
per-capita incomes tend to have relatively high effective tax rates, the distributional impact of this 
adjustment mechanism is progressive.    51
HIPC-Funded AIDS Scenario 
The HIPC debt relief simulation suggested that significant poverty reduction is 
unlikely to result from debt relief that is not accompanied by pro-poor policies. In the 
final AIDS scenario the funds saved by the government through debt relief are used to 
finance an AIDS treatment program.
13 Unlike in the previous AIDS simulations where 50 
percent of the infected adult population was treated, the treatment of only 14 percent of 
the infected population can be financed through debt relief funds. The increases in 
population, labor force and TFP are adjusted downward accordingly.  
As can be seen in the final column of Table 6, the increase in government 
consumption is still required in the HIPC-funded scenario, but in this scenario there is no 
increase in the government deficit. As a result, private consumption per-capita increases 
for all household groups. However, the gains are quite small given the limited scope of 
the program. 
The AIDS simulations presented in this section find that raising government 
health spending to address the prevalence of HIV/AIDS may involve trade-offs between 
gains for the direct beneficiaries and losses for those who finance the increases in 
government spending that are needed. Alternative financing options should be explored. 
Although the use of HIPC funds to finance the grant produced the most pro-poor results 
the opportunity cost of such funds may prohibit their use for AIDS treatment. Alternative 
uses of these funds are explored in the simulations that follow. Moreover, even if HIPC 
funds are used exclusively for AIDS treatment they are only able to provide treatment to 
a small percentage of the infected population. 
Education Scenarios 
One of the criteria for continued HIPC debt-relief is the expansion of pro-poor 
education spending. Currently the Zambian education system is characterized by 
inadequate provision at every educational level. This is due to a number of factors, 
                                                 
13 The use of HIPC funds to pay for AIDS treatment is equivalent to the use of any funds sourced abroad. 
As such this simulation can also provide insight into donor assisted AIDS treatment.   52
including insufficient numbers of teachers and inadequate teaching materials. The lack of 
teachers is driven by changes in government requirements, poor teacher benefits, and 
death due to HIV/AIDS. There are also high dropout rates even at low grades resulting 
from long distances to schools and the opportunity cost of child time (which could be 
allocated to different types of production). Over ten percent of children exit the schooling 
system between grades 1 and 6. Consequently, the goal of universal primary education 
has not been achieved (Republic of Zambia, 2002). 
In light of the shortcomings of the current education system, the government has 
identified a number of education initiatives aimed at facilitating economic growth and 
poverty-reduction, including: (i) increasing investment in basic education; (ii) enhancing 
the existing literacy program; (iii) promoting on-the-job skills training; (iv) promoting 
equity, especially gender equity; and (v) investing in secondary and tertiary schooling. 
Expanded teacher training is also needed, especially given the fact that a large number of 
teachers are victims of HIV/AIDS (Republic of Zambia, 2002).  
The Education scenarios simulate the affect that increased government education 
spending has on the skill-structure of new labor entering the labor market. In the first 
simulation the government is assumed to finance the additional education spending 
through an increase in direct taxes. In the second simulation, the funds from HIPC debt 
relief are used. Table 10 shows how the skill-structure of labor force growth is expected 
to change as well as the simulated increase in government spending. 
Table 10.   Assumptions for Education Simulations 








Labor force growth rate  Annual percentage growth rate 
Uneducated 2,071 2.0  -1.3  1.0 
Primary 1,500 2.0  4.8  3.1 
Secondary 252 1.7  3.6  2.4 
Tertiary 144 1.7  1.7  1.7 
New cost as a percentage of GDP    5.4  2.0 
Source: Authors￿ calculation (see appendix).   53
In the publicly funded simulation, government spending on education is doubled, 
with the additional spending, which equals 5.4 percent of GDP, being offset by an 
increase in direct taxes while government savings is fixed at the levels of the base 
scenario. This expansion in education spending allows labor force growth rates amongst 
the higher skill categories to increase. New workers are less likely to be uneducated 
hence the lower growth rate for that education category. Conversely, since one third of 
additional spending is allocated to secondary schooling, the supply of secondary educated 
workers increases more in the Publicly Funded scenario than in the Base.  People are 
therefore drawn out of lower education categories and moved into higher ones. For both 
scenarios, the growth rates in the total economy-wide labor force and the total labor force 
of each household group are the same as for the base simulation. It is assumed that the 
changes in labor supply for each skill level are allocated across the different households 
in proportion to their shares in the total labor force, i.e. in a manner that raises the shares 
of initially relatively poor household groups in more educated labor categories 
The results from the two Education scenarios are shown in Tables 11 and 12. 
Both scenarios lead to a moderate acceleration in GDP growth. For the first, publicly 
funded scenario, government consumption growth increases sharply. Investment expands 
in rough proportion to the general growth expansion whereas total household 
consumption declines slightly. The growth increase is driven by an increase in TFP, 
reflecting higher marginal productivities for more educated labor. In terms of 
distribution, the effects of the first scenario are strongly pro-rural. In spite of a slight 
decline in the aggregate household consumption, consumption increases in rural areas 
while poverty decreases by more than two percentage points. By contrast, in urban areas, 
poverty increases slightly and consumption declines. This outcome reflects the combined 
impact of changes in the skill structure and a financing mechanism that favors households 
with lower initial direct tax rates (including low-income, rural households). On the 
production side, the only major change is more rapid growth in public services, 
responding to the changes in government demand.    54
Under the HIPC Funded scenario the government budget deficit remains fixed 
and the cost of the education program is covered by funds normally allocated to the 
foreign debt. Apart from being smaller relative to the preceding scenario, the major 
difference is that, in the absence of any need to devote local resources to the program, 
household consumption grows more rapidly, in tandem with the rest of the economy, 
while government consumptions remains unchanged. In rural areas, this scenario permits 
a more rapid but somewhat less pro-poor consumption increase. In urban areas, 
consumption grows much more rapidly than under the preceding scenario, permitting 
poverty to fall. Among the production sectors, the gains are strongest for agriculture and 
services. 
Accelerated Agriculture Simulations 
Although agriculture is a relatively small component of GDP, it is still the main 
source of livelihood for most of the country￿s population, including the majority of 
Zambia￿s poor who live in the rural areas where the incidence and severity of poverty is 
greater. Central to the recent reform process has been drastically reduced government 
interventions in the agricultural sector. Perhaps the most important example is the 
elimination of subsidies and marketing support within the maize sector. Initially the 
government￿s attempt to withdraw from the maize sector was hampered by a series of 
severe droughts. However, by the mid-1990s, the government ceased to subsidize 
fertilizer, thus making the cultivation of maize production unprofitable in many areas of 
the country. This led to a substantial decline in maize production, particularly within the 
more drought-stricken Southern and Western provinces, where farmers shifted production 
towards crops such as sorghum and millet, which are more drought resilient and less 
intensive in purchased inputs. This has lessened the vulnerability of many of the more 
remote households in these areas, while at the same time increasing their economic 
distance from domestic and foreign markets. 
Apart from shifts towards more diverse staples production, the performance of 
cash crops has improved strongly.  Traditional crops, like cotton and sugar, have shown 
strong growth in the years following the privatization period of the mid-1990s. Cotton is   55
a particularly important sector for smallholders, who produce 95 percent of the crop. This 
is also the case for sugar, where smallholders through out-grower schemes generate half 
of total production. Finally, horticultural exports have grown considerably in recent years 
largely as a result of donor support.
14 However, with the exception of cotton, which is 
grown in the Eastern, Southern and Central provinces, most of the farmers engaged in 
cash crop production are located close to Lusaka or the country￿s main transport routes. 
Thus most of the recent gains from cash crop production have tended not to reach the 
more remote areas of the country.  
In order to assess the constraints and opportunities for significant poverty 
reduction through agricultural and agriculture-related expansion, the following 
simulations consider the impact of accelerated TFP growth in selected agricultural 
sectors. In the first simulation, TFP growth is increased by 0.5 percent per year for all of 
agriculture. The other simulations target a smaller share of GDP (an agricultural 
subsector or agricultural processing). In order to make these simulations comparable with 
the first, the rate of additional TFP growth is scaled in inverse proportion to the size of 
the targeted sector relative to all of agriculture. Table 13 shows the resulting, scaled TFP 
growth rates for this set of simulations.  
Given that the purpose of these simulations is to identify differing poverty-
reduction potential across agricultural sectors, we do not attempt to account for the costs 
of raising TFP under these scenarios.  
The general effect of increasing TFP growth is to raise the level of production in 
the targeted sectors. Increased supply lowers the prices of their outputs, raising quantities 
demanded for agricultural products in both urban and rural areas. Part of the additional 
output is exported. As long as the demand elasticities are sufficiently high, incomes and 
consumption will tend to increase for both agricultural and non-agricultural households, 
with a fall in poverty and more rapid growth as important consequences. 
                                                 
14 Exported horticultural products include vegetables and cut flowers, which are exported to the European 
market. Although this sector has performed well in recent years it remains a relatively small share of total 
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Table 13.  Increases in TFP Growth for Agriculture-Focused Simulations (2001-
2015) 
Sector  Share of agricultural 
GDP (2001) 
Scaled additional TFP 
growth rate 
Agriculture 100.0  0.5 
Staples  85.1 0.6 
Traditional  5.9 8.5 
Non-traditional  5.4 9.3 
Non-agriculture    
Agriculture-processing and textiles  21.2 2.4 
Note: Staples include maize, sorghum, millet, and drought-tolerant crops. Traditional include coffee, sugar 
and tobacco. Non-traditional includes cotton and horticulture. 
 
The results from the accelerated agricultural growth simulations are presented in 
Tables 11 and 12 above. Although accelerated agricultural growth generally increases 
economic growth and lowers poverty, there are considerable differences between the 
different scenarios. For the first scenario, where all of agriculture is targeted, growth 
increases for most macro indicators. The gains from accelerated agricultural production 
are spread quite unevenly across all household groups. Farm-based rural households do 
not benefit, whereas non-farm rural and urban households benefit through declines in 
poverty. This urban bias in poverty reduction is driven by market constraints in the 
staples sector. 
As seen in the Staples scenario, the increase in TFP growth marginally increases 
the headcount poverty rate in rural areas when compared to the Base scenario. In the 
context of highly inelastic demand, the fall in staples prices, following the large increase 
in supply, is so large that producer value added declines. These declines in price are due 
to the limited ability of the domestic market to absorb the higher level of supply as well 
as limited access to export markets. 
The importance of foreign markets can bee seen in the Traditional and Non-
traditional scenarios. For these commodities, the producers have better access to foreign 
markets where they can sell their output following the increase in TFP growth. Domestic 
markets are therefore not flooded by new supply and prices fall by less in this scenario   60
than they did in the Staples scenario. High growth in export supply generates substantial 
appreciation of the exchange rate. Falling import prices favor investment, which grows 
more rapidly under the Traditional and Non-traditional scenarios than under the Base. 
Rural households are better off due to higher production incomes, while urban 
households generally benefit from cheaper imports from the appreciated real exchange 
rate and linkages to agriculture as non-agricultural sectors respond to increased 
consumption demand from agricultural households and to increased demand for 
intermediate inputs from agriculture.  
The final simulation in this group considers the strength of backward-linkage 
effects from agricultural processing sectors to agriculture. As with the traditional and 
non-traditional sectors, the processing sector already has an established foreign market 
where it can sell its output. However, the simulated reduction in poverty favors urban 
households more than rural households as urban households earn increased returns to 
non-agricultural labor and capital. A comparison across these simulations therefore 
indicates that, while backward linkages from the agricultural-processing sectors do 
stimulate poverty reduction in rural areas, the fall in poverty resulting from accelerated 
growth in these sectors is smaller than for agricultural sectors. 
The overall conclusion from these simulations is that agricultural sectors with 
strong export potential are appropriate targets for efforts to raise productivity.  
On a cautionary note, it is clear from current regional patterns that the gains from 
accelerated agricultural growth would not be evenly distributed within rural areas. This 
dimension should be considered when strategies for rural development and poverty 
reduction are formulated. For example, horticultural production tends to be concentrated 
close to the national airport, and cotton production is currently located in the Eastern and 
Central provinces. Accordingly, the gains from the Non-traditional scenario are unlikely 
to benefit farmers in other areas of the country. Similarly, much of the country￿s export 
agriculture is concentrated near to the main rail and road transport routes. It is 
questionable whether farmers in the more remote Western and Northwestern provinces 
would be able to gain access to foreign markets. Furthermore, even if foreign staples   61
markets could be identified, the high cost of transportation in more remote areas of 
Zambia is likely to erode the competitiveness of potential exports. This final issue of 
limited transportation is addressed in the following section. 
Transport Infrastructure Simulations 
Zambia￿s PRSP sees the provision of transport as critical to poverty reduction and 
growth promotion. The previous section emphasized the importance of market access and 
its role in determining whether rural farmers can benefit from economic growth. Chapter 
9 of the Zambia CEM outlines the role that roads play in rural development, especially 
regarding farmers￿ access to input and output markets (World Bank, 2004).  
Transportation costs currently account for between 60 and 70 percent of the cost 
of production (Republic of Zambia, 2002). These costs, which are high even by regional 
standards, contribute to the high price of goods and services and hence the prevailing 
poverty in the country. Although Zambia has an extensive road network, which supports 
the dominant modes of transportation, the system has deteriorated rapidly in recent years 
(Republic of Zambia, 2002). The government has identified increased investment in 
transportation infrastructure as an important priority that may have positive effects on the 
entire economy and is critical for the development of remote rural areas. 
Market access is especially limited in many rural areas. Only 18 percent of rural 
households are within five kilometers of input markets, and few more remote households 
have access to health and education facilities (both of which have been identified in this 
report as critical for development). These households￿ access is limited due to either a 
lack of roads or the poor quality of existing roads. This section therefore attempts to 
explore the effects of (i) repairs and improved maintenance of the existing road system; 
(ii) construction of new feeder roads into rural areas; (iii) construction of new paved 
roads ostensibly into urban and less remote rural areas; and (iv) the use of HIPC funds to 
construct new feeder roads in rural areas. This is done by estimating the costs and 
benefits of such infrastructure investment based on information contained in Chapter 9, 
translating this information into additional government consumption, changes in   62
depreciation rates for the transport sector, and patterns of reductions in transportation 
costs. 
Maintenance Scenario 
According to the Zambia CEM, around 29 percent of the current paved road 
network is in need of repair (World Bank, 2004). Furthermore, much of the existing 
system is no longer maintained. The Maintenance scenario simulates the impact of 
performing the necessary repairs and then maintaining the existing system. It is difficult 
to simulate the impact of investment in transport given that the returns to such investment 
are often indirect and difficult to quantify. Information on the cost of repairing and 
maintaining the road network is taken from PRSP (2002) and is presented in the 
appendix. 
Given the extent of deterioration in the existing road network and assuming that 
only paved and gravel roads need maintenance, the information contained in the appendix 
suggests that the total cost of repairing and maintaining the current system would equal 
3.5 percent of GDP for the first three years as roads are repaired and functioning roads 
are maintained. After the third year, the road repairs are assumed to be completed and, so 
long as the roads are maintained, it is also assumed that no new repairs will be needed. 
Therefore, from year four onwards, the cost of maintenance is the only additional cost to 
government and amounts to 1.3 percent of GDP per year. Through repairing and 
maintaining the road network the deterioration of Zambia￿s roads will be lessened. 
Accordingly, the depreciation rate for the transport sector is halved from four percent to 
two percent.  
The direct impact of reducing the depreciation rate of the transport sector is to 
increase its supply, thereby bringing down the cost of trade and transport services, 
increasing the overall supply of capital, and adding to GDP growth. On the other hand, 
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The results of the simulation are shown in the third column of Tables 14 and 15. 
At the macro level, the growth rates for all GDP components and the capital stock 
increase by around 0.5 percent. All household groups gain. Poverty falls by 2.2 
percentage points with a stronger reduction in rural areas. Among the sectors, growth is 
stagnant for agriculture but increases for services and non-mining industry, in part a 
reflection of that these non-agricultural sectors include the suppliers of transport services 
and commodities that are part of the government consumption bundle. 
Construction Scenarios 
Among these scenarios, the first two attempt to contrast the effects of building 
new feeder roads in rural areas with new paved and gravel roads in less remote rural and 
urban areas. The scenarios consider a ten percent increase in the supply of feeder or 
paved roads, with the cost of these programs calculated using the information described 
in the appendix. In both simulations there is a reduction in the transaction costs targeted 
to selected sectors in the economy. In the case of feeder roads, these benefits are limited 
to agricultural production. Paved roads, on the other hand, benefit non-agricultural 
production and export agriculture. The latter is due to the existing concentration of export 
agriculture along the country￿s main road networks. Furthermore, paved roads are 
expected to reduce the transactions costs in both the domestic and export markets, 
whereas feeder roads reduce only the transactions costs in domestic markets. 
The results suggest that both construction programs increase growth and reduce 
poverty. GDP growth under both scenarios is similar, although the Paved Roads scenario 
has a slightly higher growth rate.  
Despite these similarities and similar costs of relevant government programs, the 
two simulations differ strongly in their household effects. As expected, feeder roads in 
remote rural areas influence rural households more than urban households. Rural 
consumption increases considerably more rapidly under this scenario while final-year 
rural poverty declines by more than four percentage points as opposed to a two-point 
decline for urban households.   67
Under the Paved construction scenario, urban households gain more than rural 
households in terms of consumption with unchanged poverty reduction. Poverty still falls 
significantly, by 2.5 percentage points, in rural areas. Thus under this scenario, GDP 
growth is stronger while poverty reduction is weaker relative to the feeder roads scenario. 
These results highlight a trade-off between poverty reduction and growth, pointing to the 
need to consider not only growth but also poverty effects when developing policies. 
Under the last construction scenario, funds released by foreign debt reduction are 
allocated to spending on feeder roads. Government consumption (from domestic funds) 
does not increase relative to the base scenario. The effects of road construction have been 
scaled down to reflect the size of available funds under the HIPC debt relief agreement.  
The macro effects are similar to those of the earlier feeder construction scenario, 
indicating that the combined impact of a reduction in the scale of the construction 
program and the elimination of the need to for additional domestic government resources 
cancel out.  At the household level, the effects are also quite close, with a substantial 
poverty cut and consumption gains for rural households and slightly smaller gains for 
urban households.   68
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Over the last four decades Zambia has become increasingly dependent on copper 
mining exports. This concentration of economic resources has created a bias against 
agriculture that was reinforced by high protection of manufacturing. The result of the bias 
has been to establish a pattern of agricultural production that favored non-traded staples 
to the detriment of export agriculture. Over the last decade Zambia has attempted a series 
of reforms aimed at promoting growth and poverty-reduction. While some evidence 
suggests that the government has been successful in promoting stability and liberalizing 
foreign and domestic policies, the effects of these policies on poverty and inequality has 
been disappointing. Overall poverty increased over the 1990s, although there were some 
reductions within rural areas. Urban areas have however seen significant increases in 
poverty as a result of contraction in the newly unprotected manufacturing sector and 
adverse conditions in the copper sector.  
Although poverty declines, the results for the Base scenario shows that Zambia is 
unlikely to achieve its MDG of halving poverty by 2015. The findings suggest that if 
Zambia is going to substantially reduce poverty then future economic growth has to be 
pro-poor.  
The first non-base simulations consider the impact of changes in the copper 
mining sector on growth and poverty. Based on current trends, world copper prices and 
mining output are likely to continue declining over the coming decade. The simulation 
results indicate that rural households would be cushioned from the negative effects of the 
forced structural adjustment following the decline of mining. Urban households would 
face increased poverty. Alternative scenarios, both more and less optimistic, are tested. 
Regardless of which alternative scenario is realized, the uncertainties surrounding the 
mining sector make diversification attractive. 
The possible areas into which Zambia￿s economy may diversify include 
agriculture. The findings indicate that targeting traditional and non-traditional crops, 
which have strong links to foreign markets, would enhance household welfare and   69
poverty reduction. However, the many years of copper dependency have left a legacy 
with limited marketing opportunities, both domestic and foreign, for many agricultural 
crops and regions, especially staples and remote regions. Most of recent agricultural 
growth has been concentrated along the country￿s main transport routes. The pro-poor 
outcomes of agricultural expansion would be greatly enhanced if market access were 
widened on a large scale.  
The treatment of HIV/AIDS and the provision of education are both key 
objectives in the country￿s PRSP. Approximately one percent of GDP growth is lost to 
AIDS every year. According to the scenarios considered in this report, alternative anti-
HIV/AIDS programs (funded using domestic resources or resources released by debt 
forgiveness) there are trade-offs between a slight deterioration in over-all living standards 
(in terms of per-capita consumption and poverty rates) and gains for the direct 
beneficiaries of these programs. In other words, the justification for HIV/AIDS programs 
stems from that they contribute to longevity and healthier lives for a substantial 
proportion of the population. By contrast, programs for expanding education in a manner 
that improves the overall skill level and productivity of the labor force, promise to 
contribute significantly to growth and poverty reduction.  
Improving the condition of the existing road network and extending the network 
into more remote areas are both priorities for Zambia￿s strategies for poverty reduction 
and rural development. This position is supported by the results for our simulations of 
increased productivity for export-oriented sectors within agriculture. Simulations of 
alternative programs for road maintenance and construction provide additional support 
for the importance of expanding roads. In particular, spending on feeder roads in rural 
areas leads to the strongest reductions in national and rural poverty. 
Finally, Zambia is eligible for HIPC debt relief. Although the size of the foreign 
debt is substantial, the real effect of reduced debt is through reductions in annual interest 
payments. We find that, unless the funds released by HIPC debt forgiveness are used to 
finance pro-poor policies, the impact of debt relief on poverty reduction is likely to be 
modest. Three policy areas were considered as possible recipients for these funds:   70
HIV/AIDS treatment, the provision of educational services, and the extension of the 
existing feeder road network. We found that the largest reduction in poverty would be 
achieved if the funds were used to finance the development of the road network in more 
remote rural areas. 
In sum, the simulations indicate that it will be extremely difficult for Zambia to 
achieve the MDG for poverty by 2015. No single policy measure is able to change this 
conclusion. Nevertheless, the simulations suggest that various measures, perhaps most 
importantly programs for education, infrastructure development, and improved 
productivity in export-oriented agriculture, each can contribute significantly to growth 
and reduce the headcount poverty rate by two-three additional percentage points by 2015, 
with scope for stronger gains from concerted measures in multiple areas. If utilized well, 
resources made available through foreign debt relief can provide a significant source of 
financing.  
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APPENDIX: Detailed  Description of the Simulations 
Copper Simulations 
The projected developments in the copper sector are expected to influence both 
Zambian export prices and mining output. Three scenarios are identified in the Zambia 
CEM: Low-case, Average-case, and High-case. The Average-case is considered to be the 
most likely and is therefore used in the Base Scenario. The derivation of the price and 
output changes is described in turn below. 
The following table explains how the world copper price was derived from the 
information in Chapter 7 of the CEM (World Bank, 2004). Given the projected prices for 
each of the copper scenarios, the annual growth rate was derived based on the implied 
2001 and supplied 2005 prices. 
Table A1.   Derived Copper Price Changes (2001-2015) 
Calculating the world copper price in 2001      
Annual decline in world copper prices (%)  -2% Chapter 7/CEM (WB 2004) (7.20) 
Projected copper price in 2005 ($/lb)  1.07 Chapter 7/CEM (WB 2004) (7.22) 
Implied copper price in 2001 ($/lb)  1.16  
    
Projected copper price in 2005 ($/lb)     
High case scenario  1.18 Chapter 7/CEM (WB 2004) (7.22) 
Average case scenario  1.07 Chapter 7/CEM (WB 2004) (7.22) 
Low case scenario  0.95 Chapter 7/CEM (WB 2004) (7.22) 
    
Implied annual copper price change (%)     
High case scenario  0.5%  
Average case scenario  -2.0%  
Low case scenario  -5.0%  
 
The level of copper output was taken from Chapter 7 of the CEM (WB, 2004) and 
equaled 300,000 tons. The following table outlines the output implications of the three 
copper scenarios. The key distinction between the three scenarios lies in whether the 
investment for new mines is made available such that these mines will start operations in 
2010. No new investment is made in the Low-case scenario and the mines are forced to   74
close in 2010, thus lowering the level of output to 150,000 tons. In the High-case scenario 
the new mines open and output rises to 550,000 tons. In the Average-case scenario the 
new mines do not open but there is almost sufficient investment in the interim period to 
maintain output. 
Table A2.   Estimated Copper Mining Output Levels (2001-2015) 
  Copper Mining Output (tons) 
Year Low-case  Average-case  High-case 
2001  300,000   300,000   300,000 
2006  200,000   200,000    
2007     400,000 
2009  300,000   300,000    
2010  150,000   260,000   550,000  
Source:  Chapter 7 (7.22) of the CEM (WB 2004). 
 
Taking the beginning and end period results produces an average annual growth 
rate for mining output. This produces annual compound growth rates of minus five 
percent for the Low-case scenario, minus one percent for the Average-case scenario, and 
4.3 percent for the High-case scenario. 
HIPC Debt Relief Simulations 
Information on Zambia￿s total foreign debt was taken from the RMSM. Total debt 
in 2001 amounted to 21,046 billion Kwacha. 
Table A3.   Derived Cost of AIDS Treatment Program (2001-2015) 
Total foreign debt in 2001 (million $)  5,833 RMSM 
Exchange rate (Kw/$)   3,608  RMSM 
Total foreign debt in 2001 (billion Kw)  21,046  
  
Interest due in 2001 (billion Kw)  581 RMSM 
Interest paid in 2001 (billion Kw)  222 RMSM 
  
Interest rate (due) (%)  2.8  
Interest rate (paid) (%)  1.0  
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In the model, Zambia￿s foreign debt rises every year according to the difference 
between the interest rate due and paid. The resulting trend in foreign debt accumulation 
matches that of the RMSM. HIPC debt relief leads to a once-off reduction in debt by 69 
percent. This reduces the interest paid and reduces the government deficit. In the 
simulations of HIPC funded programs for AIDS treatment, education, and development 
of transport infrastructure, it is implicitly assumed that these programs are entirely 
financed from the outside without any impact on domestic government consumption.  
HIV/AIDS Simulations 
The main calculation necessary for the AIDS simulations is the estimation of the 
total cost of the government treatment programs. This information is drawn from a 
number of sources as shown in Table A4. 
Table A4.   Derived Cost of AIDS Treatment Program (2001-2015) 
Total population   10,400,000   Household survey 1998 
Adult share of population (%)  50.0%  Household survey 1998 
Adult population   5,200,000    
    
Per capita cost ($)   360   IMF (2003) 
Exchange rate (Kw/$)   3,608   RMSM 
Per capita cost (Kw)   1,298,844    
    
Infection rate (%)  25.0%  IMF (2003) 
Number of adult infections   1,300,000    
    
Share of infections to be treated (%)  50.0%   
    
Total cost of treatment (Bn Kw)   844    
 
As described in the AIDS scenarios section, the cost of a comprehensive treatment 
program is prohibitively high. As such only half of the infected adult population can be treated if 
the public financing of the program is to remain feasible. Table A5 shows the current 
disaggregation of government consumption spending according to government function. This 
information is taken from the World Bank￿s Zambia RMSM.   76
Table A5.  Government Spending by Function (2001) 
Government spending function  Initial value 
2001 (Bn Kw) 
Percentage share 
of total 
Agriculture 69  4.1 
Industry 30  1.8 
Transportation 56  3.3 
Education 319  18.9 
Health 240  14.2 
Other 974  57.7 
Total  1,689 100.0 
Source: RMSM 
Based on the above government expenditure information, the total cost of the 
treatment (844 billion Kwacha) is half of total government expenditure in 2001 (1,689 
billion Kwacha). It also represents a 450 percent increase in 2001 health expenditure. 
As discussed in Table 9, the impact of a full HIV/AIDS treatment program will 
increase annual population, labor force, and total factor productivity (TFP) growth rates. 
These increases are taken from the IMF (2003) assessment of the impact of HIV/AIDS on 
the Zambian economy. Given that the government treatment program described above 
only treats 50 percent of the infected adult population, the gains in population, labor 
force, and TFP growth rates are half of those depicted in Table 9. Similarly, the HIPC 
debt relief, which amounts to 236 billion Kwacha in 2001, represents only 14 percent of 
the cost of a comprehensive treatment program. As such only 14 percent of the gains will 
be realized when these funds are used exclusively to treat HIV/AIDS. 
It should also be noted that there are other impacts that HIV/AIDS is likely to 
have other effects that are not considered in the analysis. These include changes in 
households￿ and government consumption spending patterns. Furthermore, the actual cost 
of a HIV/AIDS program extends beyond the cost of medication. It should ideally include 
the cost of care provision (e.g. nurses and other clinic staff) and the administration of the 
program. These costs have not been accounted for in the simulations.   77
Education Scenarios 
The education scenarios are based on assumptions regarding the cost and impact 
of government education spending. Current government spending in 2001 amounted to 
319 billion Kwacha. In the first Education scenario (Publicly-funded) the government 
triples the amount it was spending on education in 2001. In the HIPC funded scenario 
education spending increases by 74 percent. In both cases it is assumed that half of this 
additional spending is devoted to primary schooling while the other half is devoted to 
secondary schooling. It is also assumed that secondary school spending per pupil is five 
times higher than primary schooling. 
On the impact of education spending, it is assumed that for every one percent 
increase in spending on primary education, the growth rate of primary educated labor 
increases by 0.65 percent (not 0.65 percentage points). For secondary education 
spending, the higher cost of educating secondary school pupils implies that for every one 
percent increase in secondary school spending there is a 0.5 percent increase in the 
growth rate of secondary educated labor. It is maintained that the total new supply of 
labor in a given year is fixed in absolute numbers. Therefore the increase in primary 
educated labor comes at the expense of uneducated labor supply, and increased secondary 
labor supply comes at the expense of primary educated labor. In other words, the supply 
of labor is rolled-up the education levels. The applied labor force growth rates for the two 
Education scenarios are shown in Table A7. 
Table A7.  Government Spending by Function (2001) 













Uneducated 2071.0  2.0  -1.3  1.0 
Primary 1500.5  2.0  4.8  3.1 
Secondary 252.2  1.7  3.6  2.4 
Post-secondary 144.5  1.7  1.7  1.7 
Source: 1998 LCMS household survey for labor force; IMF (2003) for Base scenario growth rates; 
author￿s calculations for other education scenarios. 
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Since households now have higher educated labor, the distribution of labor income by 
skill must change from that described in Section 3 of this document. The adjustments are based 
on the assumed distribution of the stock of labor assets in the base, and the shifts in labor 
between labor education categories. It is assumed that the changes in labor force at each skill 
level relative to the base are split across the different household groups in proportion to their 
shares in the total labor force, thereby significantly raising the skill level of low-income 
households. 
Transport Scenarios 
Four Transport scenarios are explored in this document. The first involves a one-
off repair and continued maintenance of the existing road network. The remaining three 
scenarios involve the construction of new roads. These new roads take the form of either 
feeder (rural) roads, or paved/gravel (urban/less remote rural) roads. The fourth scenario 
involves the use of HIPC debt relief funds to finance the construction of new feeder 
roads. The costing of the various scenarios is presented in Table A8. 
According to the PRSP, 29 percent of the existing paved and gravel road network 
is in need of repair (Republic of Zambia, 2003). The cost of repairing a road per square 
meter is provided in the Chapter 9 of the Zambia CEM (World Bank, 2004). This cost is 
multiplied by the length of roads requiring repairs (29 percent of paved and gravel roads) 
to arrive at a final cost of 662 billion Kwacha.  
The per-kilometer cost of maintaining existing paved or gravel roads was 
calculated by multiplying the area of one kilometer of road (5000m
2) by the cost of 
maintaining a single square meter of road. This figure was then multiplied by the length 
of existing roads in Zambia (excluding feeder roads which are assumed to be maintained 
by rural communities at no cost to the government). It was also assumed that roads do not 
require maintenance every year, but rather every five years. The total cost of maintaining 
the existing network is 212 billion Kwacha, which is 13 times greater than current 
government transport spending of 56 billion Kwacha (see Table A5).   79
Table A8.   The Costing of Transport Scenarios 
Estimated costs for paved roads ($ per sq m)  Republic of Zambia (2002) 
Maintenance  5.8  
Repairs  12.4  
Construction  24.1  
    
Official exchange rate (Kw/$)  3,608.0  RMSM (World Bank) 
    
Width of road (meters)  5.0  Authors￿ assumption 
    
Number of years between maintenance (years)  5.0  Authors￿ assumption 
    
Calculated cost per kilometer ($ per km)     
Maintenance         
Paved  28,750 .0   
Gravel  12,751.0    
Repairs    
Paved  61,800.0    
Gravel  27,410.0    
Construction    
Paved  120,450.0   Republic of Zambia (2002) 
Gravel  53,423.0   ROADSIP I (District road)  
(World Bank, 2004) 
Feeder/Earth  19,892   ROADSIP I (Full 
improvement) 
    
Length of existing road (kilometers)     
Paved  6,476   Republic of Zambia (2002) 
Gravel  8,478    
Earth  21,967    
Community/Feeder  30,000    
    
Share of existing network needing repair (%)    World Bank (2004) 
Paved   29.0  
Feeder  0.0  
    
Total cost (bn Kw)     
Repairs  662  
Maintenance  212  
Construction (feeder roads)  445  
Construction (paved roads)  373  
 
For the Repairs and Maintenance scenario, the cost of repairs and maintenance are 
combined. Since the repair cost is large compared to current government transport 
spending, the cost was spread out over three years (2002-2004). It was assumed that   80
maintenance cost need not be paid on roads that have not yet been repaired. After 2004 
only the cost of maintenance is imposed on the government. The impact of this spending 
is a reduction in the rate of deterioration of the existing road network. Accordingly the 
capital depreciation rate of the transport sector is reduced from four to two percent. 
For the Construction scenarios it was assumed that the government increased the 
length of either feeder/earth or paved/gravel roads by ten percent. The cost of the two 
scenarios were calculated based on the length of the existing road network and the cost 
per square meter provided in Chapter 9 of the Zambia CEM (World Bank, 2004). The 
final costs were 445 and 373 billion Kwacha for the Feeder and Paved Construction 
scenarios, respectively.  
The impact of newly constructed roads differed according to the type of roads that 
were built. In both cases, the transactions costs margin was reduced. For feeder roads it 
was assumed that these roads are exclusively in rural areas and therefore the transaction 
cost reduction would only affect agricultural commodities. Furthermore, only 
transactions costs on domestic sales are affected. The final effect was a 30 percent 
reduction in domestic transactions costs for all agricultural commodities.  
It was assumed that paved roads are in export agricultural and urban areas, and 
that as such only export agricultural and non-agricultural commodities would be affected. 
Furthermore, both domestic and export transaction costs would be reduced. There was 
therefore a 20 percent decline in non-agricultural transaction costs and a ten percent 
decline in export agricultural transactions costs.   81
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